

24 February 1975

NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Murphy Commission Draft Reports on Intelligence

Bill:

The Murphy Commission draft reports have been provided to us as well as to Defense and NSA and comments were requested. The question of how DoD proposes to proceed on the reports impacting on their organizations was explored with Tom Latimer, ~~and Al Hall~~. It appears that they do not intend to comment on the drafts, but will await a request to react to a final draft. Fisher Howe assures me the Commission will be requesting comments.

The draft reports we have present some significant problems:

- ° Recommendations on organizational change are not related to how these will improve the responsiveness of intelligence or its performance in support of foreign policy. That needs to be done, and Fisher Howe has accepted the view with appreciation.

- ° The report fails to provide an analytic basis to support its recommendations. The report purports to support a stronger DCI; e.g., more national level review of NSA (EXCOM), as one major illustration, but it does not arrive at this conclusion from an accurate factual base.

- ° No alternatives are offered or even examined.

I've advised Howe of these differences, and he agrees the report needs more work. He has asked for factual corrections, and some of these are attached. (They do not address the recommendations or validity thereof.)



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Attachment:  
As Stated

24 February 1975

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Comments on Murphy Commission Draft Report

Introduction - no comments.

Section I, p. 8, last two lines of second para. - better words would be:

" . . . and as such is responsible for coordinating all foreign intelligence activities of the U. S. Government."

Section I, p. 10, lines 8 & 9 under DIA:

Director DIA is no longer program manager for GDIP and SRV.  
ASD(I) now has these responsibilities.

Section I, p. 11 - Under NSA. Second para. is incorrect. The Service

Cryptologic Agencies (SCAs) are under the operational and technical control of Director, NSA. The SCA Chiefs also perform certain cryptologic related functions for their parent Services, for which they receive direction from the Service Chief. Some of these Service peculiar functions do involve maintenance of field units for direct support to military forces. The relationship between NSA and the SCAs is not ambiguous.

Section I, p. 11 - NRO - I believe it is incorrect to describe NRO as a

part of "Air Force intelligence." It is not a part, either organizationally or in management and direction.

Section I, p. 12 - Many possible errors in fact or interpretation

under Service Intelligence para.

-- I question the source, validity and meaning of the large manpower figures given for Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence.

-- At least in the case of the Navy, it is totally incorrect to say that, "ONI employs about [ ] people. . . . "

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-- Given the inaccuracy of these figures, it is wrong to say, in the second sentence, that "the three major Service agencies are all (SIC -- each) larger than DIA. (ONI, for example, actually has a world-wide strength of about [ ] people.)

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-- It is also incorrect, as noted previously, to include NRO as a part of Air Force intelligence.

(Check accuracy of USIB Committee Chart)

Section II, p. 1, line 5 - change DCI to CIA.

Section III, p. 5, 2nd para. I understand the designation of the DCI

as vice Chairman of NSCIC has never been made official. Letter drafted but never signed.

Section III, p. 6, first line - strike out "director"

Section IV, p. 1, first para., last line - IRAC is "Resources" not "requirements"

Section V, p. 1, first para - This paragraph conveys a very wrong impression regarding the contribution of NSA, DIA and NRO (see last sentence) when one reads the second line, "Most of their effort is limited to 'tactical' . . . ." Perhaps use of word "much" in place of "most" would be easiest fix.

Section V, p. 2, lines 5-6 and 9-10 convey a misinterpretation.

"Tactical" or military force support intelligence elements are organic to forces as a part of the force enabling the Commander to execute his mission. They are not "nice to have" or "more comfortable" to the Commander as their reason for being, as this paragraph portrays.

The second para. is a non sequitur. The 15-85 split refers to "National" programs (Prog. III) and does not include "tactical" resources, which may be as much as double.

Section V, p. 3 - "Tactical" figures are available, as are all DOD budget items. All one needs to find "tactical" intelligence resource figures is a definition of what to include.

Section V, p. 5, NSA para., lines 4-6: I agree that military coverage dominates the SIGINT business, but I will not agree that this is "at the expense of other national needs" -- a connotation that other needs are not being met because of military dominance.  
Not True.

Section V, NSA para., last sentence, again connotes that non-military needs are not being met because of military dominance. This is not true and is the fault of DCI and USIB if it should be true.

Section V, second para., lines 3-5. Comments on further career aspirations hampering objectivity of DIRNSA is factually wrong. Only one DIRNSA has ever been advanced in his Service, and only one other has been advanced outside his Service. All other retired, and one reverted to two-star status.

Section V, p. 7, lines 2-4. The only position in NSA traditionally held by a military officer is the Director. All other senior positions do rotate and all have rotated among civilians and military.

Section V, p. 7, second para., line 3 -- word "cryptographic" should be "cryptologic."

Section V, last para. on p. 7 and first para. on p. 8 are grossly misleading in impressions of relationships between NSA and SCAs plus role of Service Chiefs. This was explained in great detail to Mr. Wm. Harris.

Section V, p. 8, 2nd para. regarding CSS. The CSS is an abortion and was deliberately engineered to be so by ASD(I) and a former Director of NSA.

Section V, p. 13 - Remedies recommended to improve the Defense Attache System are of little value. Promotion should not be


treated as a reward for one tour of duty, as suggested. The real remedy for DAS problems is to improve the prestige and image of the Military Attache, and restore personnel reductions which have cut the system by more than half.

Section VI, p.6, full para. at mid page:

Discussion equates HUMINT to clandestine HUMINT, which is wrong. Result is wrong conclusion and bad recommendation.

Section VII - no comments.

Section VIII - no comments.



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE  
DIRECTIVE NO. 6<sup>1</sup>

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE  
(Effective 17 February 1972)

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), which comprises Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) and the activities pertaining thereto are national responsibilities and must be so organized and managed as to exploit to the maximum the available resources of the Government, to satisfy the intelligence needs of the National Security Council and the departments and agencies of the Government, and to provide for efficiency and economy in the use of technical resources. Therefore, pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council authorizes and directs that SIGINT activities shall be conducted as prescribed herein.

1. Definitions

For the purpose of this directive, the terms "Communications Intelligence" or "COMINT" shall be construed to mean technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients.

COMINT activities shall be construed to mean those activities that produce COMINT by the collection and processing of foreign communications passed by radio, wire or other electromagnetic means, with specific exceptions stated below, and by the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted. Collection comprises search, intercept and direction finding. Processing comprises range estimation, transmitter/operator identification, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study of plain text, the fusion of these processes, and the reporting of results.

COMINT and COMINT activities as defined herein shall not include (a) any intercept and processing of unencrypted written communications, press and propaganda broadcasts, or (b) censorship.

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<sup>1</sup> This Directive supersedes NSCID No. 6 dated 15 September 1958, revised 18 January 1961.

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ELINT activities are defined as the collection (observation and recording), and the processing for subsequent intelligence purposes, of information derived from foreign, non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources. ELINT is the technical and intelligence information product of ELINT activities.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence

Consistent with his responsibilities as set forth in NSCID Nos. 1, 2 and 3, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:

- a. Establish with the advice of the United States Intelligence Board and issue appropriate intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities to guide the conduct of all United States SIGINT activities.
- b. Review the needs and performance of United States SIGINT activities as a basis for preparing a consolidated intelligence program budget.
- c. Establish policies and procedures for the conduct of SIGINT arrangements with foreign governments with the advice of the United States Intelligence Board.
- d. Develop and establish policies and procedures for the protection of SIGINT including the degree and type of security protection to be given SIGINT activities through the protection of information about them or derived from them.

3. The Secretary of Defense

a. The Secretary of Defense is designated as Executive Agent of the Government for the conduct of SIGINT activities in accordance with the provisions of this directive and for the direction, supervision, funding, maintenance and operation of the National Security Agency. The Director of the National Security Agency shall report to the Secretary of Defense and shall be the principal SIGINT advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Secretary of Defense may delegate in whole or part authority over the Director of the National Security Agency within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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b. The Secretary of Defense may determine, after consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence, that a SIGINT matter forwarded by the Director of Central Intelligence to the National Security Council for decision presents a problem of an emergency nature and requires immediate action. His action will be implemented and will govern, pending a decision by the National Security Council.

4. The National Security Agency

a. There is established under the Secretary of Defense and subject to his authority and control a National Security Agency with a Director who shall be head thereof and a Deputy Director who shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director during his absence or disability. The Director and Deputy Director shall be designated by the Secretary of Defense subject to the approval of the President. The duration of their appointments shall be at the pleasure of the President. The Director shall be a commissioned officer of the armed services, on active or reactivated status and shall enjoy not less than three star rank during the period of his incumbency. The Director shall have a Deputy who shall be a career civilian with SIGINT experience.

b. It shall be the duty of the Director of the National Security Agency to provide for the SIGINT mission of the United States, to establish an effective unified organization and control of all SIGINT collection and processing activities of the United States, and to produce SIGINT in accordance with objectives, requirements and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice of the United States Intelligence Board. No other organization shall engage in SIGINT activities except as provided for in this directive.

c. Except as provided in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this directive, the Director of the National Security Agency shall exercise full control over all SIGINT collection and processing activities, except the operation of mobile SIGINT platforms which will normally be exercised through appropriate elements of the military command structure. The Director of the National Security Agency is authorized to issue direct to any

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operating elements engaged in SIGINT operations such instructions issued by the Director under the authority provided in this paragraph shall be mandatory, subject only to appeal to the Secretary of Defense.

d. In consonance with the aims of maximum overall efficiency, economy and effectiveness, and to the extent he deems necessary and desirable, the Director shall centralize and consolidate the performance of SIGINT functions for which he is responsible. To this end, there is established a Central Security Service under the Director of the National Security Agency, which shall be organized in accordance with a plan approved by the Secretary of Defense. It shall be principally collection oriented and shall include SIGINT functions previously performed by various Military Department and other United States governmental elements engaged in SIGINT activities. The Director of the National Security Agency shall determine the appropriate division of responsibilities among the elements under his direction.

e. The Armed Forces and other departments and agencies often require timely and effective SIGINT. The Director of the National Security Agency shall provide information requested taking all necessary measures to facilitate its maximum utility. As determined by the Director of the National Security Agency or as directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the National Security Agency shall provide such SIGINT either through the direction of activities under his control or through the delegation to an appropriate agent of specified SIGINT facilities and resources from among the elements under his direction for such periods and for such tasks as appropriate.

f. Specific responsibilities of the Director of the National Security Agency include the following:

- (1) Formulating necessary operational plans, policies and procedures to provide for integrated operations.
- (2) Managing SIGINT resources, personnel and programs.
- (3) Conducting research and development to meet the needs of the United States for SIGINT.

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(4) Determining and submitting to the authorities responsible for logistic support for activities under his control requirements together with specific recommendations as to what each of the responsible departments and agencies of the Government should supply.

(5) Prescribing within his field of authorized operations requisite security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distribution of SIGINT material within and among the elements under his control; and exercising the necessary monitoring and supervisory control to ensure compliance with the regulations.

(6) Providing the Director of Central Intelligence with such information as he may require on the past, current and proposed plans, programs and costs of the SIGINT activities under the control of the Director of the National Security Agency.

g. The intelligence components of individual departments and agencies may continue to conduct direct liaison with the National Security Agency in the interpretation and amplification of requirements and priorities within the framework of objectives, requirements and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence.

h. It is the intent of this directive that the National Security Agency not engage in the production and dissemination of finished intelligence, but be limited to the production and dissemination of COMINT and ELINT.

#### 5. Relationship to other SIGINT Activities

a. The Director of Central Intelligence with the advice of the United States Intelligence Board shall determine the requirements and priorities for collection by SIGINT satellites that shall be developed, launched and maintained in operation by the National Reconnaissance Office. The Director of the National Security Agency, with respect to his technical and operational control of the intercept payload, and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, with respect to his control of spacecraft operations, shall provide for the tasking of these satellites based on guidance provided

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by the Director of Central Intelligence. The National Security Agency shall process the collected data.

b. Nothing in this directive shall be construed to encroach upon or interfere with the unique requirements for clandestine operations covered under NSCID No. 5. Those SIGINT collection and processing activities (other than cryptanalysis) that are specifically designated by the Director of Central Intelligence to be essential and integral to the operation of clandestine espionage and counterintelligence activities abroad, including arrangements with foreign clandestine services, shall be conducted under the provisions of that directive. To the extent practicable, however, information pertaining to the activities and derived therefrom shall be handled so as to give suitable protection to related SIGINT activities. Material collected under these circumstances that would have been considered COMINT or ELINT will be passed to the National Security Agency to the extent desired by the Director of the National Security Agency as soon as special requirements of the collector have been satisfied.

c. The Director of the National Security Agency shall conduct such COMINT and ELINT activities as are required to support electronic warfare activities. The conduct of such search, intercept, direction-finding, range-estimation, and signal analysis of non-communications electromagnetics radiation as must be undertaken to permit immediate operational use of the information in support of electronic measures and countermeasures and rescue operations, if delegated by the Director of the National Security Agency, shall be the responsibility of the Military Departments or Commands, as appropriate. The responsibility for such activities with respect to electromagnetic radiations of COMINT interest shall normally not be delegated and shall remain the responsibility of the Director of the National Security Agency.

6. The Federal Bureau of Investigation

Nothing in this directive shall be construed to encroach upon or interfere with the unique responsibilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the field of internal security, including such intercept and processing activities as may be undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in connection with its functions.

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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

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At this point NSA embarked on a major software development effort to handle the expected influx of IATS data. Cecil Phillips gave the job to John W. Saadi, who was a team chief in Phillips's C Group. Saadi, writing in assembly language, created a series of processes (called [redacted] resident on a Univac 494, which accepted the data from the communications system. The 494 built batch files and passed them to the IBM 360 through a shared disk arrangement. This was a ground-breaking task because IBM machines were notoriously difficult to interface with the machines of any other company.

The IBM 360, the first third-generation machine, was introduced at NSA in the late 1960s to replace the 7010s. [redacted]

[redacted] Each production organization wrote applications programs for the 360 complex, so that its data, handed to the 360s from [redacted] would be processed and ready for the analyst. The complex did its heaviest work at night, so that the output would be ready for the analysts in the morning.<sup>80</sup>

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Now that raw intercept files were available on computer, each production element developed databases. Some of the work in this area, especially that done by A Group to create a relational database for the Soviet problem, was on the leading edge of technology.<sup>81</sup>

#### The Communications Solutions

The impasse that had been created between NSA, DIA, and DCA lasted through the end of the Carter regime. By 1968 DCA had still failed to produce an adequate communications switch, and Carter felt that DCA failed to understand SIGINT (despite the fact that the director of DCA, Lieutenant General Richard Klocko, had been one of the founding fathers of the Air Force Security Service). But the next year brought a new director, Vice Admiral Noel Gayler, and a new approach to the logjam. Gayler moved quickly to iron out differences, and in August of 1969 he signed an agreement with Klocko covering management of the communications systems that supported SIGINT.

The agreement was a carefully crafted compromise. DCA would manage the entire system, based on technical specifications submitted by NSA. DCA could satisfy communications requirements using any type of circuitry, as long as NSA technical specifications were adhered to. The next month DCA cancelled the automatic switch contract with ITT. Shortly thereafter, OSD decided that the new DCA communications system, called Autodin, would be used for SIGINT traffic. This decision would result in NSA relinquishing a proprietary net that it had controlled since its birth. Some were not happy, but Gayler held to the compromise package, and an era of relative good feeling resulted between Gayler and Klocko.<sup>82</sup>

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Lacking a DCA automatic switch, NSA developed its own in-house version and hatched plans to use it in its own communications center at Fort Meade. The Agency decided to scrap the Teletypewriter Distributions System in use since the new building had opened in 1957 and replace it with a new communications center based on the new switches. It was to be called IDDF (Internal Data Distribution Facility), and it opened its doors in early 1972 on the third floor of the Ops-1 building. The year before, NSA introduced optical character readers in the message processing facility, an innovation which led to the elimination of the time-consuming step of teletype operators hand-poking every outgoing message. Called AMPS (Automatic Message Processing System), its rigid formatting requirements and special IBM Selectric typewriter balls were at first hard for secretaries to get used to, but a godsend to the communications center.<sup>33</sup>

#### **Automating the Collection Process**

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)(d)

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New methods of forwarding data to NSA did not change the basic process of signal collection. Most of an operator's time was still spent searching for target signals. But with the new digital technology and smaller on-site computers, it should theoretically be possible to acquire certain signals automatically. In the early 1960s, R&D began working on the development process. The early development work was done in 1963/1964 under a project called

The production model of [REDACTED] It was a more sophisticated system, which had an automated digital front end connected to several back-end manual Morse collection positions.

Digital computer-based collection systems eventually became the rule rather than the exception. Some, like the IRON HORSE system used in Vietnam (see p. 549), automated the collection of manual Morse signals. But Morse transmissions had a huge variety of formats, and the length of the mark or space varied depending on the sending operator. Computer-based collection was far more adaptable to baud-based signals. An early success in this area was Flexscop, a digital collection system [REDACTED]

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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)(d)

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# Department of Defense DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5100.20

December 23, 1971

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Incorporating Through Change 4, June 24, 1991

ASD(I)

SUBJECT: The National Security Agency and the Central Security Service

Reference: (a) National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 6<sup>1</sup>

## 1. PURPOSE

This directive prescribes authorities, functions, and responsibilities of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Central Security Service (CSS).

## 2. CONCEPT

2.1. Subject to the provisions of NSCID No. 6, and the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and pursuant to the authorities vested in the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Agency is a separately organized agency within the Department of Defense under the direction, supervision, funding, maintenance and operation of the Secretary of Defense.

2.2. The National Security Agency is a unified organization structured to provide for the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) mission of the United States and to insure secure communications systems for all departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.

2.3. The Central Security Service will conduct collection, processing and other SIGINT operations as assigned.

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<sup>1</sup> Declassified on May 22, 1990 by the Director of Administration and Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Authority: E.O. 12356, April 6, 1982).

### 3. DEFINITIONS

3.1. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is a category of intelligence information comprising all Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), and Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT).

3.2. COMINT is technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients. COMINT is produced by the collection and processing of foreign communications passed by electromagnetic means, with specific exceptions stated below, and by the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted. Collection comprises search, intercept, and direction finding. Processing comprises range estimation, transmitter/operator identification, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysts, decryption, study of plain text, the fusion of these processes, and the reporting of results. COMINT shall not include:

3.2.1. Intercept and processing of unencrypted written communications, except the processing of written plain text versions of communications which have been encrypted or are intended for subsequent encryption.

3.2.2. Intercept and processing of press, propaganda and other public broadcasts, except for processing encrypted or "hidden meaning" passages in such broadcasts.

3.2.3. Oral and wire interceptions conducted under DoD Directive 5200.24.

3.2.4. Censorship.

3.3. ELINT is technical and intelligence information derived from foreign, non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources. ELINT is produced by the collection (observation and recording), and the processing for subsequent intelligence purposes of that information.

3.4. TELENT is technical and intelligence information derived from the intercept, processing, and analysis of foreign telemetry.



3.5. SIGINT operational control is the authoritative direction of SIGINT activities, including tasking and allocation of effort, and the authoritative prescription of those uniform techniques and standards by which SIGINT information is collected, processed and reported.

3.6. SIGINT resources comprise units/activities and organizational elements engaged in the conduct of SIGINT (COMINT, ELINT or TELINT) activities.

#### 4. APPLICABILITY

The provisions of this directive apply to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, the National Security Agency, the Central Security Service, and other Defense Agencies hereinafter called Department of Defense Components.

#### 5. ORGANIZATION AND RESOURCES

5.1. The SIGINT resources of the Department of Defense will be structured to accomplish most efficiently and effectively the SIGINT mission of the United States.

5.2. The National Security Agency shall consist of a Director, a Headquarters, and such subordinate units, elements, facilities, and activities as are assigned to the National Security Agency by the Secretary of Defense in his role as the Executive Agent of the Government for the conduct of SIGINT.

5.3. The Central Security Service is comprised of a Chief, Central Security Service, a Deputy Chief, a jointly staffed headquarters, Army, Navy/Marine Corps and Air Force operating elements, and such other subordinate elements and facilities as may be assigned to the Central Security Service by the Secretary of Defense.

5.4. The Director, National Security Agency, shall also be the Chief, Central Security Service.

5.5. The Director of the National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service shall have a Deputy Director for the National Security Agency and a Deputy Chief, Central Security Service. To provide continuity in SIGINT matters the Deputy Director, National Security Agency, shall be a technically experienced civilian. The Deputy Chief, Central Security Service, shall be a commissioned officer of the Military Services, of not less than two star rank, designated by the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Chief will normally not be selected from the same Military Service as the Chief.

5.6. The Director and Deputy Director of the National Security Agency shall be designated by the Secretary of Defense, subject to the approval of the President. The Director shall be a commissioned officer of the Military Services, on active or reactivated status, and shall enjoy not less than three star rank during the period of his incumbency.

5.7. The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service shall report to the Secretary of Defense.

5.8. The Commanders of the Service cryptologic organizations and their subordinate activities which conduct SIGINT operations will be subordinate to the Chief, Central Security Service, for all matters involving SIGINT activities. In this role they will be designated as Service element commanders and subordinate activities of the Central Security Service. Unless otherwise specifically provided in this Directive, the Service cryptologic organizations will remain in their parent Services, for the purpose of administrative and logistic support.

5.9. The Secretary of Defense with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may specifically designate other SIGINT-related resources of the Department of Defense, which will be subordinate to the Chief, Central Security Service for SIGINT operations.

## **6. RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS**

6.1. Subject to the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service shall:

6.1.1. Accomplish the SIGINT mission of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service.

6.1.2. Act as principal SIGINT advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As principal SIGINT advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director, National Security Agency will keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff fully informed on SIGINT matters.

6.1.3. Exercise SIGINT operational control over SIGINT activities of the U.S. Government to respond most effectively to military and other SIGINT requirements. In the case of mobile military SIGINT platforms, he shall state movement requirements through appropriate channels to the military commanders, who shall retain responsibility for operational command of the vehicles.

6.1.4. Provide technical guidance to all SIGINT or SIGINT-related operations of the U.S. Government.

6.1.5. Formulate programs, plans, policies, procedures and principles.

6.1.6. Produce and disseminate SIGINT in accordance with the objectives, requirements and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence. (This function will not include the production and dissemination of finished intelligence which are the responsibilities of Departments and Agencies other than the National Security Agency/Central Security Service.)

6.1.7. Manage assigned SIGINT resources, personnel and programs.

6.1.8. In relation to the DoD SIGINT activities, prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense a consolidated program and budget, and requirements for military and civilian manpower, logistic and communications support, and research, development, test and evaluation, together with his recommendations pertaining thereto.

6.1.9. Conduct research, development, and systems design to meet the needs of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service and coordinate with the Departments and Agencies their related research, development, test and evaluation in the SIGINT field.

6.1.10. Determine and submit to the Secretary of Defense logistic support requirements for the National Security Agency, and the Central Security Service, together with specific recommendations as to what each of the responsible Departments and Agencies of the Government should supply.

6.1.11. Develop requisite security rules, regulations and standards governing operating practices in accordance with the policies of the U.S. Intelligence Board and the U.S. Communications Security Board.

6.1.12. Prescribe within his field of authorized operations requisite security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling, and distribution of SIGINT material within and among the elements under his control; and exercise the necessary monitoring and supervisory control to ensure compliance with the regulations.

6.1.13. Make reports and furnish information to the U.S. Intelligence Board or the U.S. Communications Security Board, as required.

6.1.14. Respond to the SIGINT requirements of all DoD Components and other Departments and Agencies.

6.1.15. Eliminate unwarranted duplication of SIGINT efforts.

6.1.16. Standardize SIGINT equipment and facilities wherever practicable.

6.1.17. Provide for production and procurement of SIGINT equipments.

6.1.18. Provide the Director of Central Intelligence through the Secretary of Defense with such information as required on the past, current and proposed plans, programs, and costs of the SIGINT activities under his control.

6.1.19. Provide guidance to the Military Departments to effect and insure sound and adequate military and civilian SIGINT career development and training programs, and conduct, or otherwise provide for, necessary specialized and advanced SIGINT training.

6.1.20. Provide technical advice and support to enhance SIGINT arrangements with foreign governments, and conduct, as authorized, SIGINT exchanges with foreign governments.

6.1.21. Perform such other functions as the Secretary of Defense assigns.

## **7. AUTHORITIES**

7.1. Subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, is specifically delegated authority to:

7.1.1. Exercise SIGINT operational control over SIGINT activities of the United States.

7.1.2. Issue direct to any of his operating elements such instructions and orders necessary to carry out his responsibilities and functions.

7.1.3. Have direct access to, and direct communications with, any element of the U.S. Government performing SIGINT functions.

7.1.4. The authority in subparagraphs 7.1.1., 7.1.2., and 7.1.3., above, is subject to review, approval and control in accordance with procedures determined by the Secretary of Defense.

7.1.5. Adjust as required, through the Service cryptologic organizations, personnel resources under his SIGINT operational control.

7.1.6. Centralize or consolidate SIGINT operations for which he is responsible to the extent desirable, consistent with efficiency, economy, effectiveness, and support to field commanders.

7.1.7. Submit, as appropriate, concurrent/letter of evaluation efficiency/fitness reports on the commanders of subordinate elements of the Central Security Service in accordance with parent Service procedures.

7.1.8. Delegate SIGINT operational tasking of specified SIGINT resources and facilities for such periods and or such operational tasks as required or as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

7.1.9. Prescribe SIGINT procedures for activities to whom he provides technical guidance.

7.1.10. Prescribe, or review and approve security rules, regulations and instructions, as appropriate.

7.1.11. Conduct those SIGINT operations undertaken in support of certain missions within the purview of NSCID No. 5.

7.1.12. Obtain such information and intelligence material from the Departments and Agencies (Military Departments, other Department of Defense Agencies, or other Departments or Agencies of the Government) as may be necessary for the performance of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service functions.

7.1.13. Maintain a departmental property account for the National Security Agency and the Central Security Service headquarters.

7.2. Other authorities, specifically delegated by the Secretary of Defense or by other proper authority to the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service in other directives or issuances, will be referenced in an enclosure to this Directive.

## **8. RELATIONSHIPS**

8.1. In the performance of its responsibilities and functions, the National Security Agency/Central Security Service shall:

8.1.1. Coordinate actions, as appropriate, with other DoD Components, and other Departments and Agencies of the Government.

8.1.2. Maintain direct liaison, as appropriate, for the exchange of information and advice in the field of its assigned responsibility with other DoD Components and the other Departments and Agencies of the Government.

8.1.3. Coordinate with other DoD Components and other Departments and Agencies of the Government to make maximum use of established facilities to preclude unnecessarily duplicating such facilities.

8.1.4. Provide for direct liaison by representatives of the intelligence components of individual Departments and Agencies regarding interpretation and amplification of requirements and priorities within the framework of objectives, requirements, and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence.

8.2. The other DoD Components shall provide support, within their respective fields of responsibility, to the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service as may be necessary to carry out his assigned responsibilities and functions.

## 9. ADMINISTRATION

9.1. To the extent applicable and consistent with the functions assigned to the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, DoD policies, regulations, and procedures will govern.

9.2. The National Security Agency/Central Security Service will be authorized such personnel, facilities, funds and other administrative support as the Secretary of Defense deems necessary for the performance of its functions. The other DoD Components shall provide support for the Agency/Service as prescribed in specific directives or support agreements.

## 10. CANCELLATION

To the extent they are inconsistent herewith, DoD Directive S-5100.20, "The National Security Agency," dated March 19, 1959, DoD Directive S- 3115.4, "Communications Intelligence," dated March 19, 1959, and DoD Directive S-3115.2, "Electronics Intelligence," dated February 7, 1967 are hereby canceled.

## 11. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

11.1. This Directive is effective upon publication.

11.2. To meet the provisions of this Directive, the Director, National Security Agency will develop a plan to implement this Directive including establishment of the Central Security Service for approval by the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

11.3. When the Central Security Service is established under the terms of this Directive and the approved implementing plan, all DoD Components will review their existing directives, instructions, and regulations for conformity and submit necessary amendments thereto to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) within ninety (90) days.



Secretary of Defense

Enclosures - 1

E1. Listing of Specific Delegations of Authority



E1. ENCLOSURE 1

LISTING OF SPECIFIC DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY BY THE SECRETARY OF  
DEFENSE TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

E1.1.1. Administrative authorities required for the administration and operation of the National Security Agency, as prescribed in DoD Directive 5100.23, dated May 17, 1967.

E1.1.2. Authority to authorize or request the procurement of cryptologic material and equipment by the Military Departments, as prescribed in DoD Directive 5160.13, dated March 20, 1956.

E1.1.3. Authority to establish and administer programs of training, as prescribed in DoD Directive 1430.4, dated August 5, 1969.

E1.1.4. Authority to assign the classification of TOP SECRET, as prescribed in DoD Directive 5200.1, "DoD Information Security Program Regulation," authorized by DoD Directive 5200.1, June 1, 1972.

E1.1.5. Authority to determine the eligibility of individual civilian officers and employees to transport or store their privately owned motor vehicles at Government expense, in accordance with provisions of DoD Directive 1418.3, dated June 28, 1965.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted

AUTHORITY EAC mk - CODEWORD-50-29-1-7  
BY 11 NARA, DATE 5/12/10 1/24/08~~TOP SECRET~~

November 5, 1971

## MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State  
 The Secretary of the Treasury  
 The Secretary of Defense  
 The Attorney General  
 The Director of Central Intelligence  
 The Director, Office of Science and Technology  
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
 The Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence  
 Advisory Board  
 The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: Organization and Management of the U.S.  
 Foreign Intelligence Community

I have recently reviewed and accepted recommendations on ways in which to improve the functioning of the intelligence community. This memorandum establishes a set of goals and directs organizational and management changes to attain them. It also expresses my concern about major resource management and substantive production problems as guidance to the community for further changes in the future.

The need for an improved intelligence product and for greater efficiency in the use of resources allocated to intelligence is urgent. Resources available for use by the intelligence community will be increasingly constrained and may have to be reduced. At the same time the product of the intelligence community will be of increasing importance to U.S. security and national interests as:

- the relative strength of Soviet and other potential military forces grows with respect to those of the U.S. where previously U.S. superiority was unquestioned;

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MORI/CDF

NSC REVIEW COMPLETED, 10/31/04

NRO review(s) completed.



- the international environment grows more complex; and financial, commercial and economic factors assume greater significance;
- the need for timely intelligence becomes greater.

## I. Objectives

Among the major objectives that must be attained if the efficiency and effectiveness of the intelligence community are to increase substantially are:

- The responsiveness of the U.S. intelligence effort with respect to national requirements must be subject to continuing review.
- Authoritative and responsible leadership for the community as a whole must be assured.
- A more efficient use of resources by the community in the collection of intelligence information must be achieved. Utilization of the means available must be in consonance with approved requirements of U.S. security and national interests.
- Assignment of intelligence functions within the community must be reviewed and revised to eliminate inefficient, unnecessary or outmoded activities.
- The quality, scope and timeliness of the community's product must be improved.
- The provision of intelligence and its utilization must enhance the formulation of the foreign, military and economic policies of the U.S. Government and the planning for and conduct of military operations by U.S. forces.

## II. The Necessary Conditions

A number of specific conditions are necessary to the achievement of these objectives.

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- The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) must delegate direct authority to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (as far as is possible without legislation) for the plans, programs, and day-to-day operations of the CIA, and must assume overall leadership of the community.
- More effective review of intelligence product quality and policy must be provided to the DCI, especially by high-level consumers of substantive national intelligence.
- Major issues within the intelligence community must be addressed in such a way that the DCI plays a major role in their resolution. The DCI must have an increased and restructured personal staff to allow him to discharge his augmented responsibilities.
- The DCI should be supported by two major committees of the intelligence community, each of which he chairs, with clearly defined advisory functions embracing his responsibilities related to intelligence production and requirements on the one hand and to intelligence budget and allocation of resources on the other.
- Intelligence collection programs, largely financed and managed by the Department of Defense, must come under more effective management and coordination with other intelligence programs.
- The NSCIDs and DCIDs must be rewritten to reflect the changes directed herein and others as they occur, particularly to reflect reassignment of functions.

### III. Measures Decided Upon

After careful consideration, I have decided that the measures listed below are to be taken now to move toward attainment of the stated objectives. They are designed primarily to: (1) enhance the authority and capability of the DCI to provide the required community leadership, (2) provide review and guidance regarding the substantive intelligence product, and (3) more effectively restructure intelligence activities.

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- I am directing the Director of Central Intelligence to assume leadership of the community in planning, reviewing, coordinating, and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of national intelligence. I shall look to him to improve the performance of the community, to provide his judgments on the efficiency and effectiveness of all intelligence programs and activities (including tactical intelligence), and to recommend the appropriate allocation of resources to be devoted to intelligence.

He will thus assume four major responsibilities:

- Planning and reviewing all intelligence activities and the allocation of all intelligence resources.
- Producing national intelligence required by the President and other national consumers.
- Chairing and staffing all intelligence community advisory boards or committees.
- Reconciling intelligence requirements and priorities within budgetary constraints.

So that he can effectively undertake this community leadership role, I am requesting the DCI to submit to me within 30 days his plan for the appropriate delegation of his current operational responsibilities and for increased staff support for his new role.

- I am directing the Director of Central Intelligence to prepare and submit each year, through OMB, a consolidated intelligence program budget, including tactical intelligence. All information required from all departments and agencies of the Executive Branch is to be made available to him in order that he may provide me with an annual detailed review of the needs and performance of the intelligence community.
- I am creating an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence, including as members a senior

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representative from the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Central Intelligence Agency. This committee is to advise the DCI on the preparation of the intelligence budget and the allocation of resources among programs, ensuring that they are employed in accordance with approved requirements and that there is no unwarranted duplication.

- I am also directing that the USIB be reconstituted under the chairmanship of the DCI including as members the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Vice Chairman); Director of Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), State Department; Director of National Security Agency (NSA); Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and representatives of the Secretary of the Treasury and of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The USIB will advise and assist the DCI with respect to the production of national intelligence requirements and priorities, the supervision of the dissemination and security of intelligence material, and the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
- I am authorizing the DCI to call upon all departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of the Government to provide requisite information to these two committees and to invite additional participation in their deliberations as may be required in his judgment.
- I am also establishing a National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC). Its members will be the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who will chair the committee. It will give direction and guidance on national substantive intelligence needs

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and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence consumer.

- As a related matter, I am directing that a Net Assessment Group be created within the National Security Council Staff. The group will be headed by a senior staff member and will be responsible for reviewing and evaluating all intelligence products and for producing net assessments of U.S. capabilities vis-a-vis those of foreign governments constituting a threat to U.S. security.
- I am directing the retention of the present management structure of the National Reconnaissance Office.
- I am directing the Department of Defense to issue such directives as are required to establish no later than January 1, 1972:
  - . A unified National Cryptologic Command under Director, NSA for the conduct of USG communications intelligence and electronics intelligence activities.
  - . A single Office of Defense Investigations.
  - . A consolidated Defense Map Agency by combining the three Service mapping organizations under arrangements that permit optimum efficiency and economy in production without impairing legitimate requirements of the separate Services.
  - . The retention of the DIA to be fully responsive to tasking by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in matters involving essential intelligence support for military planning and operations.
- I am directing staffs of the NSC, DCI and OMB, in consultation and coordination with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to make appropriate revisions not later than December 1, 1971 to the NSCID's and other directives as needed to implement the provisions of this memorandum.

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
#### IV. Remaining Problems

The changes I have directed at this time are limited, but I fully expect further changes in the intelligence community consistent with maximum practicable attainment of my objectives.

By far the largest portion of the intelligence budget is devoted to collection. It is here that savings must be sought. Future assignments of roles and missions within the intelligence community cannot be made satisfactorily by compromises among agencies.

The need to make some savings is so urgent that I have directed the Office of Management and Budget, jointly with the DCI and Secretary of Defense, to review the FY 1973 budget for intelligence and to submit specific reductions from current programs, with particular attention to tactical intelligence.

Significant improvement in the intelligence product is also needed. The NSCIC will afford improved guidance regarding consumer needs. Other changes in the consumer-producer relationship may be needed to achieve a more effective reconciliation of the demands from consumers with the limited resources available for intelligence production. It seems desirable in this connection, that resources devoted to analysis and production should increase and that a determined effort be made to upgrade analysis personnel and analysis methods. More rewarding careers for intelligence analysts, including the opportunity to reach high salary levels while remaining analysts, should be considered. An early task of the DCI should be the preparation of a comprehensive program focused upon improving the intelligence process and product.



cc: Director, Office of Management and Budget  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

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the budgetary structure. But Nixon and Helms did not get on, and the president never followed this up with specific authorities for his DCI. Helms was left to study, to coordinate, to cajole, but he was no closer to reigning in the disparate parts of intelligence, particularly those in Defense. He never did get what the Schlesinger study promised him.<sup>96</sup>

(U) Helms did accomplish one thing, however, that had long-range effects. He created a small staff, composed of a cross-section of the intelligence community, to look at the budgets of the respective (and disrespectful) agencies. This staff still existed at Langley in 1973 when Schlesinger became DCI. The new intelligence chief's intentions went awry as he struggled to contain the damage from Watergate by reorganizing CIA, but he definitely intended to grant that staff more power. William Colby, his successor in the job, pushed the status and authority of Schlesinger's small staff, which had become known as the IC (Intelligence Community) Staff. At the time, President Ford issued a new executive order putting teeth in the IC Staff's authority to control the budgets of the warring intelligence agencies, and in 1978 President Carter issued the executive order which gave the DCI "full and exclusive authority for approval of the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget." By then the IC Staff had moved into its own quarters in downtown Washington, and thus attained its own facility, with its own identity.<sup>97</sup>

#### (U) CSS

(U) The cryptologic reorganization that occurred in the early 1970s was the culmination of two decades of conflict between NSA and the JCS over control of cryptologic assets and operations. As NSA gained more authority and as the cryptologic system became more centralized, Pentagon officials became less and less pleased. A decade of war in Vietnam had produced, among other things, an internal war over cryptology. NSA's attempts in the 1960s to further centralize the business were bitterly opposed within the JCS, which had embarked on efforts to fragment SIGINT by shaving off small areas that they could call by different names (electronic warfare - EW, electronic support measures - ESM, etc.) and rid itself of the codewords that controlled dissemination. By the time James Schlesinger looked at the organization of intelligence, the deep fissures between NSA and the armed services had become almost unbridgeable.

(U) Schlesinger intended to solve the problem for all time, in NSA's favor. Clearly driven by budgetary concerns, he proposed to stamp out any JCS control over, and even involvement in, the SIGINT business. The dispute over the control of cryptology that had continued since the end of World War II would come to an abrupt end.

(U) The "end of the war" came on November 5, 1971, when Richard Nixon announced the conclusions of the Schlesinger Study. Buried in the text of this "Nixon letter" was the announcement that, by the first day of the following year, there would be a "unified National Cryptologic Command" under the director, NSA, for the conduct of United States government communications intelligence and electronic intelligence activities.<sup>98</sup>

(U) And then controversy erupted. What was a National Cryptologic Command (NCC)? What did the president intend it to do, and what were its authorities? Was this really the end of SCA independence? What would the new organization control? What was meant by "command"?

(U) Many, both within NSA and without, felt that it meant the death of the SCAs, and a new organization chart was even prepared showing all service collection activities directly under DIRNSA. One view was that the chief of the NCC would also serve as DIRNSA. In one role he would control the national cryptologic system as before; in the other, he would command the SCAs through the JCS chain of command. Most agreed that the SCA theater headquarters would expire and that their functions would be effectively assumed by existing NSA theater organizations. The opinion of Admiral Gayler counted the most, and Gayler viewed his role as akin to that of a Unified & Specified (U&S) commander, with total control over assets within his purview.

~~(S-CCO)~~ In the Pentagon, near panic ensued. Theoretically, the NCC would control all SIGINT collection. This could include the Navy's VQ squadrons, the Air Force's EC-47, and the Army's U-21 ARDF capability, [redacted] the overhead mission ground stations, tactical ELINT (including the Third Party programs that the Air Force had guarded for so many years) [redacted] Under its NCC hat, NSA might begin managing Army and Air Force tactical SIGINT programs rendering support to field commanders. At the very least, the struggle to control EW and ESM programs would be resolved in NSA's favor.

(U) DIA predicted that NSA would swing hard toward satisfying national requirements and would cease paying any attention to the satisfaction of the SIGINT requirements of tactical commanders. The independence of the SCAs would end, and, worst of all, tactical ELINT units would find themselves answering to NSA through the NCC.<sup>99</sup>

~~(S)~~ Within NSA a certain smugness settled in. The war was over, the battle was won, and to the victor belonged the spoils. The spoils consisted of those SIGINT assets that had formerly been controlled by rival factions: primarily the armed services and CIA. As November faded into December, plans were being laid to assume control of the outlying assets that NSA had never owned. This was a big win – a major revolution in the way cryptology was handled.

(U) But things began to go awry even before the end of the year. On December 23, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird informed Gayler that the new organization would not be a command – it would be called the Central Security Service. Implicit in the new name was a diminished world view. "Services," after all, could not exactly "command." Laird instructed Gayler to come up with an organizational plan and to create the new organization by February 1, 1972, a slippage of one month from Nixon's original deadline.<sup>100</sup>

~~HANDLE VIA TALENT KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY~~

(U) Concurrently, a new NSCID 6 was being written. Issued in February of 1972, it gave NSA significant new powers – and failed to give it others that, in the heady days of November 1971, folks at Fort Meade assumed they would get.

(C) The directive officially established CSS, which would be collection oriented, and would “include SIGINT functions previously performed by various Military Departments and other United States governmental elements engaged in SIGINT activities.” It did not define these functions, nor did it refer to CIA, which by omission managed to hang onto its SIGINT system. The mobile SIGINT system remained under military control, thus answering one of the biggest questions which had arisen from the Nixon Letter. But in NSA’s favor, NSCID 6 resolved the EW issue by placing it under NSA control. And on the administrative front, NSCID 6 gave the director authority over tasking, logistics, research and development, security, and career management of personnel.<sup>101</sup>


(U) Following Laird’s decision on December 23, Gayler created a series of internal panels to flesh out the CSS plan. Progress was uneven because no one seemed to agree what it should be or how it should function. Gayler gave the task of managing the disputatious committees to Paul Neff, a World War II cryptologic veteran who had held key positions in NSA’s policy councils for many years. Neff’s most vital assistants were Major General John Morrison for operations and Frank Austin for training. Much of the action fell into their bailiwicks.<sup>102</sup>

(U) Under severe time constraints (the plan was due to Laird by February 1), the committees solved the easy problems and left the tough ones for later. The new cryptologic system would be unitary, with centralized control and decentralized execution (hardly a new or controversial concept). It would be composed of NSA and the SCAs as they then existed, thus putting off the question of the system acquiring assets then controlled by the JCS and CIA. The SCAs would provide men, equipment, and facilities – CSS would operate the system.

(U) CSS would be headed by DIRNSA in a dual-hat role, and it would be assisted by a staff of its own. Composed of some 205 billets (75 from operations), it looked just like the NSA staff (see Table 7). All the staff heads were dual-hatted with their respective NSA jobs – thus John Morrison was both head of NSA production and chief of CSS operations, while Frank Austin headed NSA’s training school and CSS’s training organization.<sup>103</sup>

(U) The CSS plan produced serious fissures between Gayler and the SCA commanders, who viewed the new organization as the death knell of the independent SCAs. So they fought back, and the struggle spilled over into almost every aspect of cryptologic organization. They fought the training plan because the role of training and equipping servicemen for cryptologic duty had always been central to their being. They fought NSA’s encroachment into R&D and logistics in direct proportion to the size of their respective staffs in those functions.<sup>104</sup>

(U) Table 7  
NSA/CSS Organizational Structure



~~(FOUO)~~ A struggle ensued over cryptologic organization in the theaters. Gayler wanted SCA theater offices to collocate with the senior NSA/CSS headquarters, but eventually agreed that they could collocate instead with the component command headquarters. The senior SCA commander would be responsible for the SCA and CSS functions, and most of his people would do the same. Gayler also wanted component command level CSGs to be NSA elements, and went toe to toe with Major General Carl Stapleton of USAFSS over this issue. Stapleton won, and all component command CSGs became part of their parent SCA. The chief was the senior SCA representative in the theater.<sup>105</sup>



(U) Major General Carl Stapleton

(U) They enlisted U&S commanders to defend their interests. Admiral McCain, CINCPAC (which would soon become Admiral Gayler's own command), predicted the beginning of the end of responsive SIGINT support:

In summary, the proposed plan is viewed as placing in concrete the sterile, inherently unresponsive centralization philosophy to which field commanders have so long been opposed. The centralization of SIGINT has not been tested in a major conflict. The concentration of analytical functions at the national level will soon cause a decline in the ability of the uniformed cryptologic activities to function responsibly in a support role in combat operations especially when access to a national database is denied and integration with other intelligence data is vital. The proposal is a long step backward in the Armed Services quest for more responsive intelligence....<sup>106</sup>

~~(C)~~ The most contentious issues related to resources, and it was here that NSA had eyes bigger than its stomach. In the first heady days of CSS planning, many in the Agency envisioned swallowing every SIGINT collection asset worldwide, the theater ELINT centers, and even scientific and technical centers like the Air Force's Foreign Technology Division.

~~(S)~~ In April of 1972, Admiral Gayler convened a panel (which he himself chaired) to survey the field. The most cursory study revealed a very wide field indeed. For instance, NSA discovered that [redacted] had ELINT collection gear, [redacted] and the theater ELINT centers were very well-entrenched tactical assets.

~~(C)~~ When the smoke cleared from the battlefield, NSA had won operational control over some of the assets under contention, most notably Air Force SIGINT platforms doing national jobs. But theater ELINT centers remained under theater control; programs designed for purely tactical jobs stayed with their parent services; the Navy held onto its

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entire fleet of airborne SIGINT reconnaissance aircraft; and the Army kept its electronic warfare companies. CIA assets were not even filtered into the mix, and NSA's relationship with Langley remained on hold.<sup>107</sup> When confronted with determined service opposition, Gayler had elected to smooth the waters.

(U) One of the key aspects of the CSS reorganization was to collocate the headquarters at Fort Meade, and a new DIRNSA, General Samuel Phillips, began looking at this in the fall of 1972. The move was superficially attractive because of the money that could be saved, and it would certainly permit further dual-hatting of SCA and NSA staffs. The idea did not begin to burn itself out until a study group quantified the amount of space needed: 550,000 square feet, to be exact, at a cost of \$30 million. NSA, chronically short of space, was busy expanding into the Baltimore suburbs and could offer no space to the SCEs. It might be possible to get some office space on Fort Meade from 1st Army, but it was still inadequate, even if it could have been converted into cryptologic work space (a very doubtful proposition indeed). So the idea was virtually dead anyway when Major General Stapleton confronted Phillips with the most determined opposition that any aspect of CSS had faced. It was obvious that the Air Force would never agree, and the plan was dropped.<sup>108</sup> As Phillips later said, rather laconically, in a message to the theater cryptologic chiefs, "... there is specific and determined opposition by the SCA chiefs to such collocation. It is the expressed view of the SCA chiefs that proximity to their service headquarters is more important than collocation with NSA/CSS."<sup>109</sup> It was the understatement of the year.

(U) At the Defense Department, Dr. Albert Hall told his chief of resources management, Lieutenant General Phillip Davidson, to keep watch over the implementation of CSS. By January of 1973, Davidson's watchdog, Robert E. "Red" Morrison, was ready to throw in the towel. Morrison wrote to Hall that the CSS staff concept had not worked. Agency employees had not accepted the dual-hat idea and were not ready to relinquish their carefully garnered authority. According to Morrison, "... the 'dual-hat' concept has served mainly as a way to keep the status quo." NSA had never transferred authority over tactical SIGINT assets to CSS, and field commanders had reciprocated with suspicion and mistrust of the CSS mechanism. CSS had cost NSA over 200 billets and had produced nothing in return.

(U) At NSA, Sam Phillips had seen enough. Lacking any semblance of DoD support, and unwilling to make the drastic changes in CSS authority that would be necessary to keep the concept functioning, Phillips killed it. The date of death was listed as April 16, 1973. On that date, Phillips eliminated the CSS staff, transferring authority instead to a new deputy director for field management and evaluation (DDF), who also became deputy chief, CSS. He dropped the idea of dual-hatting and instead transferred authority for CSS activities to existing NSA positions, elevating them at the same time to deputy director status. Thus assistant director for production became deputy director for operations, communications security became ruled by a deputy director, and Phillips created the post of deputy director for research and engineering, with authority over both NSA and SCA

~~HANDLE VIA TALENT KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY~~

research efforts. Other staff chiefs were elevated to assistant directors; all had additional responsibilities for CSS management.<sup>110</sup>

(U) In 1976, when a new director, Lew Allen, went looking for CSS, he found only a paper organization. Associated with CSS, his resource people could find only General Allen himself (he was named on paper as chief of CSS); the DDF incumbent, who served as the deputy CSS; and a military staff of fewer than ten people.<sup>111</sup>

(U) The CSS exercise benefited the cryptologic system by further centralizing such functions as research and development, personnel administration, and certain aspects of logistics. In these areas, NSA's staff authority expanded into areas that were of common concern to NSA and the services. The biggest changes were in training, where Frank Austin, the dynamic leader of the National Cryptologic School, presided over a long-term centralization of training functions, and a rationalization of the system to the point where the individual SCAs served as executive agents to separate aspects of a now-joint training system. And, though the meetings were often stormy, the SCA chiefs were brought into closer contact with Gayler and his staff. Gayler institutionalized this into Wednesday morning breakfasts with his SCA chiefs, and thus brought a more direct and personal atmosphere into what had been a remote and long-distance relationship.<sup>112</sup>

(U) So in certain respects, the addition of "CSS" to the NSA logo marked a permanent change in the way business was done. But the larger changes that had been so keenly anticipated in the fall of 1971 would have required steamroller tactics worthy of Brownell at his best. The JCS had been bested by Brownell in 1952 because he had the backing of the president. Twenty years later the president was not engaged, and the JCS won.<sup>113</sup>

#### **(U) The Murphy Commission**

(U) The period following the Vietnam War was extraordinarily fruitful with reorganization studies. Those which touched cryptology bent the process in a new direction. One such was the Murphy Commission.

(U) The Murphy Commission was set up by Congress rather than by the president. Its main purpose was to examine the process by which American foreign policy was set. The chairman, former ambassador Robert D. Murphy (then chairman of Corning Glass), was to report back to Congress by June 1975. Murphy was looking at foreign policy at a time when Henry Kissinger occupied positions as both secretary of state and national security advisor, and perhaps this was the reason that Murphy concentrated on national security and intelligence issues. Of the four subcommittees, the one on national security and intelligence, chaired by Murphy himself, dealt with NSA.

(U) It was hardly surprising that Murphy should echo the climate of the times. Following Schlesinger (and a host of others before him), he recommended splitting the job of DCI into two people – the political advisor to the president should work downtown, while the administrator of CIA, who would be his deputy, would manage the agency itself. He advocated giving the DCI further control over the intelligence budget (meaning, in

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16 August 1968

The Honorable Richard Helms  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Helms:

Enclosed herewith is the Report of General Lauris Norstad, Dr. Eugene Fubini, Ambassador Livingston T. Merchant and the undersigned responsive to the Terms of Reference of 11 September 1967. The following reflects, in very general terms, its findings and recommendations.

1. There is need for a long-range National Intelligence Plan within which periodic guidance can be provided to assure that the most effective resources are available and used to meet the present and foreseeable requirements of the United States Government.

2. Guidance must be target-oriented and relate the value of information received to the particular resources which produced it.

3. The creation of the National Intelligence Resources Board and the broadening of the programming and planning staff of the Director of Central Intelligence should be helpful in providing both such a long-range plan and the required periodic guidance.

4. There is need for a point of central review within the Department of Defense where all intelligence programs, including COMINT and ELINT, are looked at as a whole. Otherwise, as targets multiply both in numbers and sophistication, the magnitude of the effort will reach unacceptable proportions. In the reduction, the most effective resources may suffer along with the least.

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NRO and DIA review(s) completed.

JCS and OSD review(s) completed.

NSA review(s) completed.

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5. There must be authoritative management over each of the several COMINT and ELINT programs.

6. Authority of the Director, National Security Agency, over all COMINT resources must be reaffirmed and clarified, including his authority over the Service Cryptologic Agencies as to all COMINT resources within their control. He should have the right to enter objections to the inclusion within the Service Cryptologic Agencies of other resources to the extent they would detract from the major mission of the Agencies in carrying out the NSA mission.

7. The Director, NSA, should strengthen his programming and planning staff by including more high-level military and civilian personnel from other agencies having expertise in the cryptologic area. In this connection, consideration should be given to integrating the programming and planning staffs of the Service Cryptologic Agencies into NSA. Military tours of duty at NSA should be extended and the establishment of career opportunities for military cryptologists within the Armed Forces should be encouraged.

8. The removal of resources by the military from the control of NSA should be discontinued. This will only be successful if the military can be assured that the COMINT resources developed by NSA will effectively perform in both the Direct Service and Direct Support roles.

9. The overall centralization of ELINT resources within NSA as contemplated by the Security Council Directive of 1959 is neither workable nor necessary, and the Directive should be amended accordingly. This is essential if the present confusion and duplication of ELINT resources is to be eliminated and avoided in the future.

10. Those ELINT resources essential in providing radar order of battle and conducting electronic warfare should be designated, assigned to, and programmed by the Services and included within their several budgets.

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11. Those ELINT resources not falling within these classifications should be managed by the National Security Agency. There should be placed within the Services only those ELINT resources which provide information which cannot adequately be supplied by the National Security Agency. The several types of ELINT are not subject to exact definition but decisions can and should be made on a case-by-case basis. Some duplication will, and probably should, result.

12. The NSA should provide, and the Services should use, the training, technical and other support facilities essential to the operation of military ELINT resources within their control.

13. The management, collection and processing of satellite ELINT is generally satisfactory. Some clarifications in the directive establishing the National Reconnaissance Office are suggested to reflect currently satisfactory practices.

14. An effort should be made by NSA and NRO to eliminate the least efficient ELINT satellite payloads and more importantly, to ascertain whether some substantial part of ground, sea and air efforts cannot be eliminated with the increasing effectiveness of satellite collection.

15. Authority over the tasking, collection and processing of satellite COMINT and Telemetry should be definitely placed within the NSA as these satellites become effective.

16. The present effort to consolidate and close overseas bases should be encouraged and extended. Caution should be exercised not to abandon, voluntarily, any area of the world for reasons of economy, if they may one day become important again, and once abandoned cannot be re-entered. Caution must also be exercised in returning second-echelon processing to the US to ensure that military requirements, both present and future, will not suffer.

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17. The management of [redacted] is generally satisfactory, except with respect to the technical and tasking authority of NSA which must be more fully recognized and utilized.

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19. No firm recommendations have been made with respect to either the [redacted] programs.

In conclusion, there must be no slackening in the US cryptologic effort if essential military and other national needs are to be met. The task of the future will be to determine those resources best calculated to meet the growing requirements and to assure their efficient management.

This Report could not have been prepared without the unfailing, indefatigable and, above all, understanding effort of [redacted]

Unfortunately, many of its recommendations do not meet with their equal enthusiasm.

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Copy No. 17

14 August 1968

GENERAL COMMENTS

1. A re-evaluation of the COMINT and ELINT efforts of the US Government is appropriate because of developments in the more than fifteen years since the establishment of the present organization for the management of COMINT and in the ten years since ELINT was placed in the same framework.
2. The vast increase in signals subject to interception, the rapid advance in the technology for interception from the ground, air, sea and space, the new geographic areas of interest to the intelligence community, give rise to new problems in the programming of requirements and the provision of resources to meet them, now and for the foreseeable future.
3. The intelligence community is generally satisfied with the quality of the product, its dissemination, the technical competence of personnel and the maintenance and modernization of resources.
4. There are problems, however, with respect to several aspects of COMINT and ELINT. These problems, together with suggestions as to how they may be met, are set forth below.

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PROGRAM GUIDANCE

1. There is need for a long-term National Intelligence Plan setting forth objectives, targets and priorities essential to provide that guidance to the Secretary of Defense, the intelligence community and formulators of intelligence programs which will assure an adequate and efficient allocation of resources responsive to the present and foreseeable requirements.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence, in providing such guidance, must make authoritative and consistent determinations as to the importance of such requirements in relation to the probable costs of their fulfillment and express authoritative judgments as to the relative effectiveness of intelligence collection programs in the satisfaction of intelligence needs. Thus, requirements of minimal importance can be ruled out or relegated to low priority in favor of those whose cost-benefit ratio appears more favorable. The present listing of Priority National Intelligence Objectives is inadequate for this purpose.

3. Within the scope of such a long-range Plan, which must be updated as conditions change, there is need for periodic guidance to program formulators in connection with annual reviews of the various intelligence programs.

4. Such guidance must be sufficiently specific in character and so relate the value of information to the resources which produced it as to provide a basis for decision as to which resources can be reduced, eliminated or expanded and what new resources are required.

5. Guidance can be meaningful only when given against knowledge and recognition of the cost involved, the capabilities of all available resources and a considered determination of the particular resources which will best cover the target.

6. Guidance must be target, rather than collection, oriented, with resource assignment recommendations where appropriate. This is essential to avoid redundancy of resources and duplication in the coverage of targets, particularly as targets and means of collection multiply both in numbers and sophistication. Otherwise:

(a) Resources will tend to determine information produced, rather than respond to information required;

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(b) Demands will be placed upon resources in excess of their capabilities;

(c) Information will be produced more or less on an ad hoc basis, responsive to immediate demands of particular users, rather than to overall national requirements, including the essential demands of the Services for support and other purposes.

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THE DCI AND THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES BOARD

1. The creation by the DCI of a National Intelligence Resources Board should be helpful to him in providing both long and short-term guidance. The presence on this Board of the principal user agencies will assist the DCI in evaluating information received against the resources which produced it.

2. In discharging his responsibility for national intelligence planning and program guidance, the DCI should be aware of possible concern arising from the fact that he is both a claimant on intelligence resources to support his intelligence production mission and the final judge of the community's requirements.

3. The DCI should consider not only broadening the functional scope but also strengthening the representation of the military and civilian intelligence community on the staff which assists him in discharging his national intelligence planning and program guidance responsibilities. The inclusion on this staff for extended tours of senior military officers, high-level Foreign Service Officers and others having expertise in all forms of intelligence, policy making and operations would:

(a) Provide the DCI with a corps of personnel who, by their experience and competence, should contribute to more objective intelligence planning, guidance and evaluation;

(b) Tend to ensure that the needs of military commanders will not be neglected in favor of other national needs;

(c) Raise confidence in the National Intelligence Plan and shorter-term program guidance.

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CENTRAL REVIEW AND COORDINATION

1. Basic to this report is the establishment of a central point within the Department of Defense where COMINT and ELINT programs can be compared and reviewed as a whole and evaluated against the guidance provided by the DCI, including his evaluation of the relative productivity of the several COMINT and ELINT resources in the light of information produced. This central review must take full account of all other available collection capabilities of the community, including photography, radar, and other more esoteric sources, and the CIA Program.

2. With the increasing number and sophistication of targets and collection resources, together with rapid technological advances, an unacceptable burden will be placed upon men, facilities and money unless resources are planned and budgeted as a whole.

3. Such a review will tend to assure that:

(a) There will be proper trade-offs among COMINT and ELINT resources and resources of other types. Hopefully, this will reduce the normal tendency to impose horizontal cuts to meet budgetary requirements, and thus help to assure that those resources providing the greatest certainty of success will not suffer at the expense of those of lesser capabilities.

(b) The relative value of all resources can be evaluated against targets to assure the most effective and efficient means of collection and analysis.

(c) As in the case of the broadened DCI Staff, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to essential military requirements will receive proper consideration in relation to other national needs.

4. The Department of Defense should ensure that all elements of the cryptologic program, in addition to being reviewed against other programs, are subject to a single decision-making procedure, properly time-phased with budgetary guidance. The present system is undesirable as Consolidated Cryptologic Program issues are decided prior to the issuance of such guidance, with resulting duplication.

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CONTROL SYSTEMS (CNS)



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MANAGEMENT OF THE CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNITY

1. The correlation of the several programs must be supplemented by efficient resource allocation and authoritative management within each of the intelligence programs.
2. The improvement of long-term and periodic guidance given by the DCI to NSA should help materially in permitting NSA to plan and allocate its resources more effectively so as to meet the requirements of the entire intelligence community.
3. There are indications of a lack of mutual confidence on the part of NSA and the Services as to each other's competence to perform the complementary services essential to the fulfillment of their respective requirements. The Services lack confidence in the ability of NSA to support military operations. NSA is concerned that the Services may convert the bulk of COMINT and ELINT resources to their control and use, with the result that these resources may not be applied to the maximum benefit of all users.
4. These problems are minimal in terms of the total effort, but are serious in that they result in inefficient use of scarce resources. The increasing disenchantment of the Services will tend to encourage them in the acquisition of their own COMINT and ELINT resources, perhaps beyond their requirements. Not only will duplication result, but more importantly, limited personnel may not be most effectively utilized.
5. There are a number of possible causes for the difficulties faced by the Director, NSA:
  - (a) Lack of direct access to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense for reporting purposes and a relative remoteness with relation to others within the Department of Defense who have a claim on COMINT and ELINT resources;
  - (b) The failure of the directives issued by the Services to the Service Cryptologic Agencies fully to recognize the responsibility placed upon the Director by the Security Council Directive establishing NSA as manager of the COMINT and ELINT programs of the Government;

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(c) Diffused and uncoordinated planning by the Service Cryptologic Agencies among themselves and in relation to NSA;

(d) Concern, whether justified or not, that there is inadequate military representation within NSA at management levels;

(e) The physical separation and isolation of NSA from the Services which contributes to an increasing lack of communication essential to mutual confidence.

6. The recent Hubbell Report recognized the need for service personnel at high levels within NSA. The billets recommended have not been filled because of Congressional limitations on the number of general and flag-rank officers and the demanding requirements for senior officers in the Southeast Asian theater.

7. The Services should therefore be mindful that the lack of an adequate military presence in NSA is not solely the fault of the Director, NSA. Unless senior officers are assigned to NSA in sufficient numbers to assure that the requirements of the military are adequately considered, there is a likelihood that these requirements will not be met.

8. To improve the situation, the following comments and suggested actions should be considered:

(a) The authority of the Director, NSA, over activities of the Service Cryptologic Agencies covered by the Consolidated Cryptologic Program should be reaffirmed and, in fact, recognized by the Services. At present, Service directives to those agencies fail to take this authority fully into account and should be modified accordingly.

(b) The Director, NSA, should exercise his present review responsibility for all Service Cryptologic Agency program items related to research, development, deployment and operations of resources within the Consolidated Cryptologic Program and NSA budget. In addition he should be given the opportunity to concur or non-concur with respect to all other Service Cryptologic Agency resources to the extent such resources would detract from the basic mission of those agencies in support of NSA. This would not confer the right of veto.

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(c) The modest start toward the establishment of a cryptologic career within the Services should be encouraged so that it will attract and retain both officers and enlisted personnel of the quality required by this exacting discipline. It should provide an opportunity to rise to the top without the necessity of other assignments, except, and importantly, as required to develop a well-rounded intelligence capability.

(d) Tours of duty at NSA and in the Service Cryptologic Agencies should be extended. Limited tours are not adequate to qualify military personnel for these responsibilities. An infusion of high-level civilians from all intelligence agencies into NSA and from NSA to other intelligence agencies and the Service Cryptologic Agencies for extended periods would be helpful. This will work only if positions of responsibility commensurate with rank and abilities are made available in those agencies.

(e) The tendency on the part of the military, unilaterally, to remove essential resources, both men and equipment, from the approved Consolidated Cryptologic Program is detrimental to the entire effort and should be resisted.

9. Concern has been expressed by the Services over the tendency to centralize certain functions at NSA which have historically been conducted by the Service Cryptologic Agencies in the US or in the operational theaters. With the increasing sophistication of both collection systems and communications, the present and foreseeable political pressures, together with budgetary and foreign exchange necessities, pressures will undoubtedly grow to withdraw from foreign theaters and centralize in the US.

10. These demands and the increasing centralization at NSA referred to above must be approached with the greatest caution because:

(a) There will always be an essential requirement for some collection and processing capabilities within every theater of operation, the need mounting as tension mounts.

(b) The balance between overseas processing and centralization at NSA must be kept under continuous review to be certain that our military capability does not suffer.

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(c) Although many overseas billets can be filled by civilians and increased central processing will be necessary, it must not be forgotten that military personnel must be trained and facilities available to fill these exacting needs in times of crises.

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NSA STAFF ORGANIZATION

1. The Director, NSA, much like, but to a far lesser degree than the DCI, wears two hats, one for operations and the other for developing and maintaining the Consolidated Cryptologic Program.
2. It is his responsibility to provide the skills and resources necessary to meet the long-range National Intelligence Plan, including resources which will be responsive to the periodic guidance given by the DCI.
3. He has an additional responsibility for day-to-day operations to assure that resources covered within the Consolidated Cryptologic Program are available and tasked and that the take is processed.
4. The Director, NSA, should broaden his staff charged with long-term policy, planning and programming by the inclusion of competent military and civilian officers from the intelligence community assigned for extended tours. As a move in this direction, consideration should be given to transferring parts of the Planning Staffs of the Service Cryptologic Agencies and integrating them with such a broadened NSA Staff.
5. The task of this staff would be to assist the Director, NSA, in preparing the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, including program changes, to assure the availability of resources required to meet national and military demands for information, both long and near-term. This would serve to assure the DCI, the Service Cryptologic Agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, theater commanders and other users that their needs and points of view were represented as decisions affecting their programs and resources were being reached.

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COMINT, TELEMETRY AND ELINT RESOURCES

1. The National Security Council Intelligence Directive establishing the authority and responsibility of the Director, NSA, treats COMINT and ELINT resources as generally subject to the same degree of central control.

2. The experience of the past ten years since control of ELINT was placed in NSA indicates that the large bulk of ELINT resources must be excepted as lying within the responsibility of the Services, rather than NSA. Although the directive recognizes this, it fails adequately to define those exceptions.

3. New classifications of resources--Electronic Warfare, Passive Electronic Countermeasures--are being created by the Services to claim certain resources similar to, if not precisely identifiable as, COMINT and ELINT resources.

4. Duplication of resources, collection, processing and control will reach unacceptable proportions unless the allocation of resources is clarified.

5. The military commands have a clear need for information requiring the development and deployment of resources capable of supporting their operations and for obtaining control, delegated or otherwise, of certain of these resources as the military situation may require.

6. COMINT and ELINT resources and the responsibility for their programming and operation should generally fall within the following categories:

COMINT Resources

1. This category includes all resources devoted to communications intelligence to fulfill national, including military, requirements, exclusive of resources in support of Electronic Warfare as defined below [p. 14, para. 6(i)].

2. Management responsibility over all such COMINT resources has been placed under the Director, NSA, and should remain there. Portions of these resources will, from time to time, be required by the

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Approved For Release 2001/08/13 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400150002-8

military commanders for direct support of their operations. This need can be met within the spirit of the Direct Support Concept Paper of November 1967, as agreed to by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director, NSA.

3. The concept provides a means by which prompt decisions can be made as to whether and when certain resources engaged in Direct Service activities should be transferred for Direct Support. It should be adequate, provided that resources exist and are designed to produce the information required by the combat commanders with the requisite degree of accuracy and timeliness. Unless this condition is met, the COMINT system will have failed in the performance of a major function, and the Services will, of necessity, have to develop their own resources.

4. It should therefore be made clear that the Director, NSA, working closely with concerned military authorities, has the responsibility for ensuring that the total COMINT resources planned and programmed will include the best possible mix of resources possessing the physical characteristics and operational capabilities for performing in either the Direct Service or Direct Support roles.

5. Fulfilling this responsibility will necessarily require the Director, NSA, to make program decisions in full consideration of military requirements and to provide for military influence in the crucial areas of concept formulation, system design, operational doctrine and other policy matters which directly affect the quality and quantity of the Direct Service and Direct Support which military commanders can expect to receive.

#### Telemetry Resources

Telemetry intercept was not included as either COMINT or ELINT in the 1958 Security Council Directive. It is similar in security handling to ELINT, but it is an information-carrying signal whose analysis and exploitation more closely resembles COMINT. Its processing is for the most part managed by NSA at present, and this situation is generally satisfactory. It is recommended that Telemetry intercept be treated as COMINT except for its security regulations, and that NSA exercise developmental, operational, tasking and technical control over Telemetry intercept resources, subject to certain exceptions in satellite Telemetry collection as noted below.

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ELINT Resources

1. Over the past ten years, it has become apparent that the decision to place ELINT as a whole within the COMINT structure of NSA has not proved to be workable. While COMINT is properly the subject of centralized control, there is no need for such control of ELINT.

2. In budgetary terms, ELINT resources, except for those in the NRP, are a comparatively small part of the CCP. Their usefulness, particularly to the Services, however, is very great. As signals subject to interception multiply, and as collection vehicles become more responsive, the military importance of ELINT will increase. This is not to indicate that certain ELINT resources, and a substantial part of all the ELINT take, are not important to other national intelligence objectives nor to the function of COMINT.

3. With respect to a large part of the ELINT resources, it must be recognized that they differ generally from COMINT resources in the manner in which they are controlled and used, their products, the security protection accorded them and the skills required to use them.

4. Perhaps as a result of these differences, although COMINT is now all but entirely under the management of NSA, only a small part of ELINT resources, national in character, is under such management. The impact of ELINT and ELINT-related activities on military operations is too direct, continuous and useful for the control of these operations to reside entirely in NSA.

5. NSA should manage the collection (except that under NRO) and the processing of ELINT signals of national strategic importance, such as those related to the control of foreign strategic offensive forces, of foreign space and ABM programs.

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COMMUNICATIONS AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

The inflated dissemination list for COMINT products places a heavy load on communication circuits and courier service. Large numbers of publications are sent electrically or carried to a large number of addressees whose need is often marginal at best. This is essentially an internal management problem within the Department of Defense. It is recommended that there be a careful screening of requests for distribution from the Services and theater commands to eliminate unnecessary distribution of COMINT materials.

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~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

28 DEC 1971

## MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

SUBJECT: The National Security Agency and The Central Security Service

As of this date I have signed a revised DoD Directive S-5100.20 covering the National Security Agency (NSA) and establishing a Central Security Service (CSS).

I am appointing you Chief, Central Security Service, in addition to your present appointment as Director, National Security Agency. You will report directly to me in both capacities.

I would like to have the plan specified in the directive submitted to me by 1 February. In your preparation of the plan, you may consult with the military departments and other agencies of the Government whose SIGINT operations you will be responsible for under the revised National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 6. I am placing great weight on your development of this plan and would expect you to work in its preparation with appropriate elements of my staff, particularly with the ASD(I). There are a number of elements your plan should contain, among which are:

1. An organization plan. ✓
2. A list of SIGINT assets which you believe should be assigned to the NSA/CSS.
3. A time-phased implementation schedule.

In your development of the plan for establishment of the CSS I want to emphasize the necessity to include specific provisions to assure improvement in effectiveness and economy in the following important areas:

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-13-2012 pursuant to E.O. 13526

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR  
INTERIM: NON CONFIDENTIAL  
EXPIRATION DATE: 2000

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X-5620

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1. Program Management
2. Budget and Fiscal Control
3. Training
4. Management of RDT&E
5. Procurement
6. Mission Tasking
7. Operating Procedures
8. Career Development

Please include in the plan a statement on the manner in which you expect to attain these objectives.

As a final point, I would like you to describe specifically the methods and procedures by which you propose to provide for complete responsiveness to the legitimate needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military commanders. I put great weight on improving our capability in this area, as I know you do.

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DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Adm G:

The  
NSCID #6  
papers

Pre return


ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR PRODUCTION  
MEMORANDUM

DATE 6 Aug 69

SUBJECT JCS Proposed Changes  
to NSCID

TO DIR: 6

[ At yesterday's session on the JCS proposed changes to the NSCID, I mentioned the possibility that the paper had been handled in the office of Brigadier General Lukeman. I verified that fact this morning. General Lukeman is Chief, Strategic Plans & Policy Division, J5. Colonel Hanks, who was listed as the Action Officer on the GREEN, works for General Lukeman.



JOHN E. MORRISON, JR  
Major General, USAF  
ADP

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ADN

D/DIR

25 July 1969

D32



P.L. 86-36

JCS Draft Revision of NSCID No. 6 (U)

Attached, for your information, is our analysis of the draft revision of which Mr. Autry obtained a copy last week.



P.L. 86-36

Chief, D32

Incl:

a/s

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This correspondence may be declassified upon removal of the inclosures and physical removal of the cover note(s).

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25 July 1969

The JCS Draft Revision of NSCID No. 6

The net effect of the JCS draft revision is to enhance EW and "tactical operations" at the expense of SIGINT, and to erode the authority of the Director, NSA, even over what would be left of SIGINT, in favor of the JCS and the U & S Commands. It constitutes a bill of complaints against the present system of centralized control, and it removes SIGINT activities conducted in support of tactical operations from centralized control.

SUMMARY

The principal changes provided for by the JCS draft revision are:

a. SIGINT activities will be governed only by this directive, while EW, except as otherwise established under this directive, will be treated as being within the framework of general intelligence activities.

b. The conduct of interception will not be considered "a proprietary function of SIGINT."

c. Certain functions "integral" to SIGINT processing will also be considered "integral" to EW.

d. "SIGINT Tasking Authority" is substituted for "Operational Control," and associated definitions from OPDOC 13 are inserted.

e. In addition to determining the degree and type of security protection to be given COMINT and ELINT activities, USIB is to provide for a continuing review to ensure responsiveness to changing needs, etc

f. Pending a USIB decision, an interim action or decision by SecDef will govern on any SIGINT matter forwarded to USIB by a USIB member

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g. COMINT (as well as ELINT) activities may be delegated by SecDef to military commanders or Military Departments for direct support purposes.

h. The NSA mission is to be limited to technical control and support of all U.S. SIGINT activities, and tasking authority only for such U.S. SIGINT activities as are not otherwise provided for in this directive (i.e., not many).

i. The Director, NSA, will

- (1) Have a term of three years rather than four.
- (2) No longer be authorized to obtain "such information or intelligence material . . . on matters of operational and technical control as may be necessary." He will be authorized only to obtain "SIGINT technical information" and "SIGINT-related intelligence material" from "SIGINT operating elements."
- (3) No longer be able to say that his instructions are mandatory, subject only to appeal to SecDef
- (4) Be limited to that R&D "necessary to accomplish the mission of NSA," but he shall provide "technical assistance" on R&D conducted by the military services, etc., in support of direct support SIGINT requirements. He shall not have any R&D coordinating function.

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- (5) Not be able to prescribe "requisite security regulations covering operating practices," etc., even within NSA's eroded field of authorized operations. He can only develop and forward "proposed security regulations" to USIB through SecDef. He will, of course, have no monitoring or supervisory control, inspections, etc., to ensure compliance with regulations.
- (6) Provide "timely technical information" to military commanders and civilian agencies when requested
- (7) Report to USIB through SecDef (since no longer a member of the Board?).  
*This point is not quite clear but can be interpreted as off the USIB*
- (8) No longer discharge his responsibilities in accordance with his own judgment, subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense, etc.
- (9) No longer decide what facilities and resources he will delegate, and for what periods, etc., for direct support purposes.

j. The JCS will be inserted in what amounts to assumption of the SecDef executive agent function insofar as military requirements for SIGINT support are concerned

k. The Military Departments will be assigned the conduct of R&D to satisfy "Service SIGINT resource requirements."

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1. The U & S commanders will be responsible for developing requirements and submitting requests for SIGINT resources to the JCS, and for advising the JCS of conflicts involving the allocation and sharing of SIGINT resources.

m. Notwithstanding all other provisions of the directive, the Military Departments are authorized to provide for -- and the U & S commanders are authorized to conduct -- such intercept and processing of any electromagnetic radiations as need be undertaken to support tactical operations, including electronic warfare, training, and search and rescue.

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~Document No. 1

September 15, 1958

SPECIAL LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 6\*COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE

1. Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) and the activities pertaining thereto (as defined in paragraph 3 of this directive) are national responsibilities whose importance to national security requires an organization and management which will:

a. Exploit to the maximum the available resources in all participating departments and agencies to satisfy legitimate requirements for foreign intelligence relating to the national security, including those of the departments and agencies concerned;

b. Provide for efficiency and economy in the use of technical resources; and

c. Insure the necessary degree of protection.

Therefore, pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council authorizes and directs that COMINT and the COMINT activities of the United States, as well as ELINT and ELINT activities, shall be conducted as prescribed herein. COMINT and ELINT and their associated activities shall be treated as being within the framework of general intelligence activities except as otherwise established under this directive.

2. Only those departments or agencies represented on the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) are authorized to engage in COMINT or ELINT activities and only in accordance with the provisions of this directive.

3. Definitions.

For the purpose of this directive, the terms "Communications Intelligence" or "COMINT" shall be construed to mean technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients.

\* This directive supersedes NSCID No. 9, revised 29 December 1952, and NSCID No. 17, dated 16 May 1955.



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COMINT activities shall be construed to mean those activities which produce COMINT by the interception and processing of foreign communications passed by radio, wire, or other electromagnetic means, with specific exceptions stated below, and by the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted. Interception comprises search, intercept, and direction finding. Processing comprises range estimation, transmitter/operator identification, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study of plain text, the fusion of these processes, and the reporting of results.

COMINT and COMINT activities as defined herein shall not include (a) any intercept and processing of unencrypted written communications, press and propaganda broadcasts, or (b) censorship.

ELINT activities are defined as the collection (observation and recording), and the technical processing for subsequent intelligence purposes, of information derived from foreign, non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources. ELINT is the technical and intelligence-information product of ELINT activities.

4. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

In addition to its responsibilities as set forth in paragraph 2 of NSCID No. 1, the United States Intelligence Board shall:

a. Study, in connection with its responsibilities for communications intelligence security, the standards and practices of the departments and agencies in utilizing and protecting COMINT; and establish procedures whereby departments and agencies not members of the U. S. Intelligence Board are enabled to receive and utilize COMINT.

b. Determine the degree and type of security protection to be given COMINT activities through the protection of information about them or derived from them; taking into full account that different levels of sensitivity obtain and applying balanced judgment between the need for exploitation of the COMINT produced and the need to protect the specific producing activity or activities. Procedures for special handling will include treatment of the information in its initial stages and also as it may be included in finished intelligence.

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c. Determine the degree and type of security protection to be given ELINT activities through the protection of information about them or derived from them. Special COMINT security standards and procedures generally shall not apply to ELINT and ELINT activities.

5. The Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense is designated as executive agent of the Government for the conduct of COMINT and ELINT activities in accordance with the provisions of this directive and for the maintenance and operation of the National Security Agency.

a. The Secretary of Defense may determine, after consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence that a COMINT or ELINT matter forwarded by the U. S. Intelligence Board to the National Security Council for decision presents a problem of an emergency nature and requires immediate action. His action will be implemented and will govern, pending a decision by the National Security Council.

b. The responsibility to conduct those ELINT collection and processing activities which the Secretary of Defense determines are essential to provide direct support to commanders who plan and conduct military operations, will be delegated by the Secretary of Defense to those commanders, or to the cryptologic agencies which support them.

c. The Secretary of Defense may delegate in whole or part authority over the Director of NSA within his department as he sees fit.

6. The National Security Agency.

a. The COMINT and ELINT missions of the National Security Agency (NSA) shall be to provide an effective, unified organization and control of the (1) COMINT and (2) ELINT intercept and processing activities of the United States, to provide for integrated operational policies and procedures pertaining thereto and to produce COMINT information and ELINT information in accordance with objectives, requirements and priorities established by the U. S. Intelligence Board.

b. NSA shall be administered by a Director, designated by the Secretary of Defense after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose appointment shall



be for a term of four years. The Director shall be a career commissioned officer of the armed services on active or reactivated status, and shall enjoy at least 3-star rank during the period of his incumbency. The Director shall have a civilian Deputy.

7. The Director, National Security Agency.

a. The Director of NSA shall be responsible for accomplishing the mission of NSA. For this purpose all COMINT and ELINT intercept and processing activities of the United States are placed under his operational and technical control. When action by the Chiefs of the operating agencies of the Services or civilian departments or agencies is required, the Director shall normally issue instructions pertaining to COMINT and ELINT operations through them. However, because of the unique technical character of COMINT and ELINT operations, the Director is authorized to issue direct to any operating elements under his operational control task assignments and pertinent instructions which are within the capacity of such elements to accomplish. He shall also have direct access to, and direct communication with, any elements of the Service or civilian COMINT or ELINT agencies on any other matters of operational and technical control as may be necessary, and he is authorized to obtain such information and intelligence material from them as he may require. All instructions issued by the Director under the authority provided in this paragraph shall be mandatory, subject only to appeal to the Secretary of Defense by the Chief of Service or head of civilian department or agency concerned.

b. Specific responsibilities of the Director of NSA include the following:

(1) Formulating necessary operational plans and policies.

(2) Conducting research and development to meet the needs of NSA and the departments and agencies which are engaged in COMINT or ELINT activities; and coordinating the related research and development conducted by such departments and agencies.

(3) Determining and submitting to the authorities responsible for logistic support for NSA, requirements together with specific recommendations as to what each of the responsible departments and agencies of the Government should supply.



(4) Within NSA's field of authorized operations prescribing requisite security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distribution of COMINT material within and among the COMINT elements under his operational or technical control; and exercising the necessary monitoring and supervisory control, including inspections if necessary, to ensure compliance with the regulations.

(5) Making such reports and furnishing such information from time to time to the Board, either orally or in writing, as the Board may request, and bringing to the attention of the Board either in such reports or otherwise any new major policies or programs in advance of their adoption by him.

(6) Except on matters which have been decided by the Board, the Director of NSA shall discharge his responsibilities in accordance with his own judgment, subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

c. To the extent he deems feasible and in consonance with the aims of maximum over-all efficiency, economy, and effectiveness, the Director shall centralize or consolidate the performance of COMINT and ELINT functions for which he is responsible. It is recognized that the Armed Forces and other departments and agencies being served require direct COMINT and ELINT support of various kinds. In providing this support, operational control of specified COMINT and ELINT facilities and resources will at times be delegated by the Director, for such periods and for such tasks as are determined by him, to an appropriate agent. Each member department or agency is responsible for stating to the Director, NSA its requirements for direct support.

d. The Director shall make provision for participation by representatives of each of the Board members in those offices of NSA where the Director, NSA establishes priorities of intercept and processing.

e. It is the intent of this directive that NSA not engage in the production and dissemination of finished intelligence, as distinguished from intelligence information. The production and dissemination of finished intelligence are the responsibilities of departments and agencies other than NSA.



b. Other provisions of this directive are not applicable to those intercept and processing activities (other than cryptanalysis) undertaken under the authority of NSCID No. 5, whether by the Central Intelligence Agency or by the military departments, which are specifically excepted by the Director of Central Intelligence. However, to the extent practicable, information pertaining to these activities and derived therefrom shall at all times be handled as to give suitable protection to related COMINT activities or COMINT activities in general. Material which may be collected under these circumstances and which otherwise would have been considered the product of COMINT or ELINT activities will be passed to the National Security Agency to the extent desired by the Director, NSA, as soon as special security requirements of the collector have been satisfied.

9. The Military Departments. The Military Departments shall be responsible for:

a. The establishment, maintenance, operation and administration of COMINT and ELINT intercept and processing facilities as authorized and directed by the Secretary of Defense.

b. The conduct of those intercept and processing activities (other than cryptanalysis) undertaken under the authority of NSCID No. 5 as specifically excepted from other provisions of this directive (NSCID No. 6) by the Director of Central Intelligence. However, to the extent practicable, information pertaining to these activities and derived therefrom shall at all times be handled as to give suitable protection to related COMINT activities or COMINT activities in general. Material which may be collected under these circumstances and which otherwise would have been considered the product of



COMINT or ELINT activities will be passed to the National Security Agency to the extent desired by the Director, NSA, as soon as special security requirements of the collector have been satisfied.



c. The conduct, outside the scope of paragraphs 6 and 7 of this directive, of such search, intercept, direction finding, range estimation, and signal analysis of communications and non-communications electromagnetic radiations as must be undertaken to permit immediate operational use of the information in support of electronic measures and countermeasures and rescue operations.

10. The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Nothing in this directive shall be construed to encroach upon or interfere with the unique responsibilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the field of internal security, including such intercept and processing activities as may be undertaken by the FBI in connection with its functions.